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The foundation of New Zealand’s 
pension system is New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS). Although NZS 
is ‘generally acknowledged to be the 
simplest retirement set-up in the OECD’ 
(Rashbrooke, 2009, p.98), retirement 
income policy is influenced by multiple 
and sometimes competing objectives, 
including financial affordability, political 
sustainability, income adequacy and 
intergenerational equity (Retirement 
Commission, 2010, p.52). 
NZS is a universal, flat rate, taxable 
pension funded out of current taxation 
on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Its 
design continues to ‘ensure that old age 
is not a period of continuing poverty 
and hardship, regardless of the quality of 
life people have experienced before then’ 
(Cook, 2006, p.14). The current adequacy 
of NZS is evidenced by the low levels of 
poverty among those aged 65 and over. In 
fact, overall ‘poverty rates for those aged 
65+ have been considerably lower than 
those for the rest of the population over 
the full period from 1982 to 2010’ (Perry, 
2011, p.130).
Access to NZS is remarkably open. An 
applicant who is a New Zealand resident is 
required to have lived for only 10 years in 
New Zealand, with five of those after the 
age of 50 (the 10(5) rule). A contributory 
record is not required, making New 
Introduction
As in most industrialised countries, demographic ageing in 
New Zealand is putting pressure on the public retirement 
pension scheme. The increasing mobility of citizens adds 
to the complexity of determining fair policies for pension 
eligibility and portability.
The global trends of population ageing and increasing 
labour mobility require suitable and equitable policies for 
public pension portability. An increasing number of New 
Zealanders spend some years working overseas; and an 
increasing number of overseas-born citizens immigrate 
to and retire in New Zealand. Both these groups may 
have contributed through taxation and/or through 
compulsory or voluntary payments, into superannuation 
or pension schemes, perhaps in more than one country. 
Both are affected by the pension policies of the countries 
where they have contributed, and to which they wish to 
retire. (Dale, St John and Littlewood, 2009, p.4)
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Zealand unusual in the OECD. The 
years-based residency qualification 
establishes an ‘all or nothing’ threshold: 
there is no pro-rata entitlement; however, 
those who do not meet the 10(5) rule may 
qualify under a reciprocal social security 
agreement. 
Accessing NZS is a matter of a 
straightforward interview at a Work and 
Income New Zealand office for most 65 
year olds. It may take a matter of only a 
few minutes with the correct supporting 
documents. For some who have spent 
time abroad or who immigrated to 
New Zealand, however, it can be far 
less straightforward. Any entitlement to 
a state pension from another country 
may reduce their NZS, sometimes to 
zero under section 70 of the 1964 Social 
Security Act (the direct deduction policy, 
DDP)1 even when residency requirements 
have been met.
At 31 July 2010, out of a total 
population of approximately 4.3 million, 
561,053 New Zealand residents aged 65 
and over were receiving either NZS or the 
veteran’s pension, and over 10% of these 
were also entitled to an overseas pension 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2011, 
pp.316-8). 
Between 2007 and 2011, the 
Retirement Policy and Research Centre 
(RPRC) at the University of Auckland, 
in collaboration with the Human Rights 
Commission, and more recently with 
the Centre for Accounting, Governance 
and Taxation Research of Victoria 
University, produced numerous research 
publications and convened forums on 
the issues of overseas pensions in New 
Zealand and pension portability.2 The 
findings were that while the DDP may 
appear to save the government money, 
there are important fiscal sustainability 
issues raised by New Zealand’s overseas 
pensions policies. More immediately, New 
Zealand’s overseas pensions policies are 
inequitable in many respects and prevent 
the possibility of concluding reciprocal 
social security agreements with some 
countries, for example Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland, Sweden and the United 
States (Ministry of Social Development, 
2008a). 
The issues are complex, and likely to 
get more so as the population ages. This 
article first argues that the DDP must be 
seen in the demographic context in New 
Zealand, and then outlines the current 
plight of retirees with entitlements to 
overseas pensions. Possible short-term 
reforms are proposed, with a change in 
residency suggested as one option for 
a longer-term solution which may also 
reduce future fiscal vulnerability of New 
Zealand’s retirement income policies. 
Demographic pressures
New Zealand is not alone in the transition 
to lower mortality and fertility rates (see 
Figure 1). Globally, the proportion of the 
population aged 65 and over is expected to 
rise from the 8% of 1950 to at least 21% by 
2050 (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2008). Currently the proportion 
of the New Zealand population that is 
over age 65 sits at just over 13%, and this 
is projected to increase to 15% within the 
next five years and to 21% by 2031 (Jackson, 
2011, p.3). Jackson (2011, pp.9-10)3 warns 
that Statistics New Zealand’s projections 
for average months life expectancy gained 
each year, even using the low mortality 
assumptions, may be too conservative. 
Regardless of whether pensions are 
contributory, funded or PAYG, there will 
be emerging tensions: 
The steady increase of older age 
groups in national populations, both 
in absolute numbers and in relation 
to the working-age population, 
has a direct bearing on the inter-
generational and intra-generational 
equity and solidarity that are the 
foundations of society. (Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008) 
While the rest of the OECD is 
acknowledging the costs directly related 
to their ageing populations (Chand and 
Jaeger, 1996; Bongaarts, 2004; McDonald, 
2005), New Zealand appears to be 
focusing more attention on the ‘welfare 
crisis’ posed by the 13% of working-age 
residents currently on welfare benefits 
(Welfare Working Group, 2011; Ministry 
of Social Development, 2012). 
New Zealand faces a rising burden 
of retirement pensions, even with high 
labour force participation rates for 
those aged over 65,4 and even after the 
introduction in 2003 of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, which partially 
pre-funds NZS and smoothes the tax 
burden of the cost of NZS between 
generations of New Zealanders.5
In contributory PAYG schemes, to 
keep annual budgets in equilibrium 
as the population ages contribution 
rates must be driven up, benefit levels 
reduced, qualification age increased 
and/or a means test introduced. In New 
Zealand’s case, where eligibility for the 
age pension is based not on contributions 
but on a minimal residency test, the same 
parameters affect fiscal sustainability and 
perceptions of equity. Cost pressures are 
also expected to increase in the health 
sector, including greater demand for 
long-term care. 
Gross expenditure on NZS for 2011/12 
is projected to be $9.6 billion. Without 
allowing for longevity improvements, the 
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Figure 1. Proportion of population aged 65 and over by global region, 1950-2050 
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net cost to the taxpayer, which excludes 
the long-term care and health costs of 
increasing numbers of superannuitants, 
is projected to double between 2005 and 
2050 as a proportion of GDP (Bell et al., 
2010). In this context, policies around the 
way in which immigrants and emigrants 
gain access to NZS are increasingly 
important in terms of both equity and 
fiscal sustainability. 
As noted, a high proportion of retirees 
have access to some overseas pension, but the 
decision to settle and retire in New Zealand 
is usually made well before retirement age. 
Between 2002 and 2011, net permanent and 
long-term migration to New Zealand was 
positive. In the year ended February 2012, 
however, there were 83,900 permanent and 
long-term arrivals, but there was an overall 
net loss of 4,100 migrants, and the highest 
net loss ever of 39,100 people to Australia 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2011). 
Factors affecting migrants’ decisions 
include the institutional set-up of the 
country, the taxation and benefit regime, 
the physical environment and schooling 
system; and individuals take account 
of ‘their access to the labour market, 
relevant net amounts of (household) 
income to be earned, local costs of 
living, and the existence of networks 
of co-nationals or members of their 
ethnic groups who moved to the host 
country at an earlier stage’ (Munz and 
Werding, 2005, pp.204-5). Individuals 
also migrate from low-wage countries 
to high-wage countries, and although it 
may appear that wages (net of taxes) are 
the main driving force behind migration 
decisions, Wildasin (1999, p.16) notes that 
differentials in public pension provision 
between countries are not an insignificant 
motive.  
On the other hand, Munz and 
Werding (p.205) note that public pensions 
can entail an ‘entrance fee’ for potential 
migrants, and therefore can ‘create a 
barrier for voluntary migration, even 
where it would be beneficial in terms of 
an optimal factor of re-allocation’.  In 
the case of migration to New Zealand, 
the DDP may be considered by some as 
a fairly steep ‘entrance fee’ (Dale, St John 
and Littlewood, 2009, p.8). 
The issues are complex, despite 
differences in pensions policies that on 
their own appear to make retiring in New 
Zealand relatively attractive. 
Pension portability and reciprocal social 
security agreements 
A social security agreement aims to co-
ordinate the social security systems of two 
countries. It serves to eliminate residence 
and citizenship barriers to access to social 
security and ensure that individuals who 
have divided their working lives between 
two countries receive appropriate 
coverage when they retire in their country 
of choice. New Zealand has nine bilateral 
social security agreements: with Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Jersey 
and Guernsey, the Netherlands and the 
UK. The social security agreements vary 
but allow people to use their residency in 
New Zealand to qualify for a state pension 
in the agreement country or to receive 
up to 100% of NZS (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2008a). In the 1980s, after 
migration patterns globally increased 
and diversified, general portability 
provisions were introduced that allowed 
superannuitants to take 50% of their 
gross NZS with them. The amendments 
to the New Zealand Superannuation and 
Retirement Income Act (NZSRI Act) 
2010 then extended 100% (gross) NZS 
portability on a pro rata basis to non-
agreement countries.
The 2010 amendments largely 
addressed the potential inequities for 
pensioners who leave New Zealand 
after qualifying for NZS. However, 
the amendments did not address the 
anomalies and inequities for those 
who retire in New Zealand with an 
entitlement to an overseas pension. They 
also introduced some further anomalies: 
for example, by allowing gross NZS to 
be taken to other countries regardless 
of whether tax is deducted in those 
countries as it is for superannuitants in 
New Zealand.6
Section 70 and the direct deduction policy
Even if the residency requirement is met, 
the chief executive of New Zealand’s 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD) 
may apply section 70 of the Social Security 
Act 1964, the DDP, if a resident receives 
a ‘state pension’ from another country 
that is analogous to NZS. ‘Analogous’ is 
clarified as meaning: 
the benefit, pension or periodical 
allowance, or any part of it, is in 
the nature of a payment which, in 
the opinion of the [chief executive], 
forms part of a programme providing 
benefits, pensions, or periodical 
allowances for any of the contingencies 
for which benefits, pensions or 
allowances may be paid under ... 
the New Zealand Superannuation 
and Retirement Income Act 2001 ... 
which is administered by or on behalf 
of the Government of the country 
from which the benefit, pension or 
periodical allowance is received ... . 
(Social Security Act, 1964, section 70)
Table 1 shows the growth in the 
numbers of recipients of NZS who also 
have an overseas pension by the major 
countries of origin, some of whom 
may be returning New Zealand citizens. 
While some of these overseas pensions 
may not be deductible and there may be 
some double counting, most of the total 
New Zealand’s Overseas Pensions Policy: Enduring Anomalies and Inequities 
Table 1:  MSD clients receiving an overseas pension, by main countries of origin
Country 2004 2010 % increase
Australia 914 7,248 693%
Canada 306 1,152 276%
China 166 494 198%
Fiji 45 115 156%
Germany 87 245 182%
Ireland 91 207 127%
Netherlands 2,400 3,539 47%
Switzerland 82 191 133%
UK 37,754 44,681 18%
USA 98 447 356%
(Source: Ministry of Social Development 2011, pp. 316 - 318)
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of 59,300 pensioners are affected by the 
DDP (Ministry of Social Development, 
2011). 
The purpose of section 70 is to 
eliminate the possibility of a person 
receiving two state old age or other 
pensions, known colloquially as ‘double-
dipping’. This policy is based on the 
reasonable belief that an immigrant to 
New Zealand should not be advantaged 
over a New Zealand resident who has 
spent their entire life in New Zealand. An 
individual retiring in New Zealand with 
large retirement savings in a state fund 
in another country paid out as a pension 
may receive no NZS, despite having spent 
long periods of their working life in New 
Zealand. At the same time, a further 
consequence of the 2010 amendments to 
the NZSRI Act is that immigrants subject 
to section 70 who choose to stay in New 
Zealand can be treated less generously for 
NZS than if they decide to leave (Dale, St 
John and Littlewood, 2010; Dale and St 
John, 2011; Smith, 2011).7 
Complexity and inequity arise 
with interpretation and application of 
section 70, and with definitions of ‘state 
pension’. Many superannuitants argue 
that part or all of their overseas pension 
has arisen from their own and their 
employers’ contributions and is akin to 
a supplementary pension scheme outside 
the basic state pension, analogous to 
KiwiSaver,8 for example, rather than to 
NZS. If people feel they have not been 
treated fairly they can make a complaint 
to the chief executive of the MSD, who 
can order a hearing by the Social Security 
Appeal Authority. If not satisfied with 
the outcome, the complainant may then 
take their issue to the Human Rights 
Commission. If the Human Rights 
Commission agrees there may be valid 
grounds for a complaint, an opinion may 
be sought from Crown Law.9
Unfortunately, those difficulties and 
apparent injustices resulting in the many 
complaints brought to the Social Security 
Appeal Authority and the Human Rights 
Commission in recent years have produced 
little resolution for complainants. People 
have subsequently taken their complaints 
on to the retirement commissioner, the 
RPRC, members of Parliament and the 
media. 
While the ministry’s response has 
been that they apply the law correctly, it 
is noteworthy that their frequent reviews 
of New Zealand’s pension system and its 
relationship to those of other countries 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2004, 
2005, 2008a, 2008b) have produced 
many recommendations, including the 
following (2008a, pp.13-21): 
• remove foreign state pensions built 
up by voluntary contributions from 
the scope of section 70 of the Social 
Security Act; 
• discontinue the policy of deducting a 
person’s overseas pension from their 
partner’s NZS entitlement;
• clarify the wording of section 70 so it 
is in plain English, and set out each 
country’s pension regulations.
In particular, deducting foreign 
state pensions built up by voluntary 
contributions, and deducting a person’s 
overseas pension from their partner’s 
NZS entitlement, could be considered to 
be human rights infringements. 
What overseas pensions should count for the 
DDP? 
Accurate presentation of pension 
systems of an economy and the 
comparison of systems across 
economies are crucial parts of policy 
analysis. Yet such presentations 
and comparisons are far from easy. 
They require a well-thought-out 
methodology, access to detailed 
information on national systems, 
verification of information and results 
by a network of pension experts to 
provide feedback to improve the 
quality and applicability of the research 
over time. (OECD, 2009, p.3)
Under the current legislation, behind 
closed doors and with no requirement 
that the basis of the decision be made 
public, the chief executive of the MSD 
determines which overseas pensions are 
analogous to NZS. Although the decisions 
are made with legal guidance, remarkably 
they appear to override any evidence that 
the particular pension comprises savings 
additional to the basic state pension. The 
MSD, in the 2008 review as quoted above, 
acknowledges that the DDP is applied 
to foreign state pensions built up by 
voluntary contributions.
It appears that, in part, the DDP policy 
remains in place as a result of a lack of 
appreciation of the structure of overseas 
pensions. For example, the MSD review 
(2008) states: ‘NZS has a simple period of 
residence and presence requirement and 
an “all or nothing” entitlement’. It then 
states that, by contrast, ‘[m]ost other 
countries have pension systems in which 
a retiree’s level of entitlement is based on 
social security contributions made by that 
person over the period of their working 
life’ (Ministry of Social Development, 
2008a, p.3). This is an oversimplification. 
Most other countries have a more 
complex pensions system than NZS, and 
the boundaries between social insurance 
and private, occupational pensions are 
often blurred. Many countries have a basic 
pension which may be means-tested, and 
an additional mandatory, contributory 
employment-based pension, which may 
or may not be government administered, 
which will provide an income to the 
retiree based on their and their employer’s 
contributions. Whether they are voluntary 
or mandatory, most overseas occupational 
retirement saving schemes also benefit 
from state subsidies, usually through the 
tax system (Rashbrooke, 2009). These 
two-tier systems are equivalent to NZS 
plus KiwiSaver, suggesting that that is how 
they need to be treated under section 70. 
The chief executive of the MSD may 
decide that a particular overseas pension 
should be taken into account in the 
calculation of NZS, and that the DDP 
should apply, if, as stated in section 70 
of the Social Security Act, the pension 
is ‘administered by or on behalf of 
the Government of the country from 
which the benefit, pension or periodical 
allowance is received’. Importantly, as 
Smith (2009, p.16) emphasises: 
under the [DDP], the total amount of 
a pension paid to a claimant will be 
determined by New Zealand only. An 
individual retiring in New Zealand 
with a generous public pension 
entitlement from another country 
could possibly receive no [NZS] thus 
relieving New Zealand totally from 
the cost of paying pensions to such 
individuals despite them having spent 
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part of their working lives in New 
Zealand. On the other hand there is 
a case for the [DDP] on grounds of 
preventing a ‘windfall’ where a person 
receives two public pensions because 
they split their working life between 
two countries and qualified for a public 
pension in both of them without 
invoking the totalisation provisions of 
a [social security agreement]. 
Inconsistencies in what pensions 
are considered to be of like nature to 
NZS have been identified during the 
RPRC’s research. The MSD appears 
to make its decisions based on which 
entity is ‘providing benefits, pensions, or 
periodical allowances’ (Social Security 
Act, section 70). However, the ‘nature of 
[the] payment’ (another key expression in 
section 70), or the underlying philosophy 
of the benefit concerned, should be more 
material than the identity of the provider 
or administrator.
The test of the ‘state as the pension 
provider’ has led to a number of 
inconsistencies in the application of 
section 70. For example, the Tier 2 
Canada Pension Plan is included in the 
DDP, while the equivalent compulsory 
Chilean arrangement, delivered by private 
providers, is not. Another example: the 
UK’s state-provided ‘state second pension’ 
(S2P)10 is included in the DPP, while the 
alternative, equivalent, ‘contracted-out’ 
entitlement is not. Yet the alternative 
scheme is required by UK law to cover 
the same contingencies that the S2P 
covers; and the sponsoring employer and 
employees receive reductions in their 
National Insurance contributions to pay 
for the contracted-out benefits. 
Another acknowledged difficulty is 
that some countries’ public pensions 
perform the dual functions of providing 
retirees with an acceptable standard of 
living, and providing benefits directly 
related to the person’s period of 
employment and remuneration (in New 
Zealand, ‘workplace-related provision’). 
Such a ‘hybrid’ scheme operates, for 
example, in Greece. Clearly, a single rule 
cannot be devised to cover all situations. 
Is the DDP justified?
In many cases where the DDP is applied its 
use is appropriate, although the affected 
retirees may disagree. The provision of 
two full basic state pensions where each 
is designed to protect a basic standard 
of living would be iniquitous. However, 
it often comes as a significant shock 
to a retiree to find that their voluntary 
retirement savings, set aside out of earned 
income to improve their quality of life in 
old age, is deducted by the MSD against 
their NZS entitlement.11 Such retirement 
savings, if set aside from New Zealand-
based earnings equivalent to, for example, 
KiwiSaver or some other occupational 
superannuation scheme, would not result 
in a reduction of NZS. 
Importantly, as stated in a 2004 MSD 
report to the Minister of Finance:
New Zealand’s policies on payment 
of NZS overseas and of overseas 
pensions into New Zealand are 
out of date and inequitable. We 
are significantly out of step with 
the ‘seamless’ provision of social 
security adopted in Europe and many 
countries overseas, which impacts 
negatively on other New Zealand 
Government priorities concerning 
positive aging and immigration …The 
direct deduction policy has remained 
largely unchanged since its inception 
in 1938. New Zealand’s migration 
patterns have increased and diversified 
significantly since then, making the 
dollar-for-dollar deduction of an 
overseas pension from a person’s 
New Zealand pension entitlement an 
inexact and often unfair method of 
sharing social security costs between 
countries. Because these policies have 
been developed in a largely ad hoc 
manner, they have become inequitable 
with one another and, in some cases, 
have diverged from their original 
policy intent. (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2004, p.10) 
A 2005 report to the Minister of 
Finance was even more critical:
There are approximately 51,000 New 
Zealanders who receive overseas 
pensions that are directly deducted 
from NZS. The majority of these 
people have been in New Zealand 
for more than 30 years and are 
living on modest incomes. Seven 
percent of these people were born 
in New Zealand. Currently the direct 
deduction policy produces annual 
savings for the government of $174 
million … The direct deduction 
and payment overseas rules are an 
increasing source of dissatisfaction 
amongst superannuitants. This 
is partly because of increasing 
international mobility, which means 
more people are affected by these 
rules … Lastly, the policy is difficult 
to administer because it is not 
always clear which pensions should 
be deducted. (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2005, pp.1-2)
It is cause for concern that some cases 
reveal a lack of clarity, consistency and 
accuracy in the way the DDP is applied 
to overseas contributory pensions. It 
may be perceived that not only is there 
an absence of fairness and transparency, 
there is a violation of the human right to 
be treated in a non-discriminatory way.  
Family status discrimination 
One particularly egregious aspect of the 
current DDP practice is abatement of a 
person’s NZS by reason of their partner’s 
overseas pension. A spouse may lose 
some or all of their NZS if the partner’s 
overseas pension income exceeds their 
NZS entitlement. For each of a married 
couple living in New Zealand with no 
overseas pension deemed analogous to 
NZS, the entitlement to NZS is fixed and 
paid without regard to the other spouse’s 
If one partner’s NZS is 
fully reduced to zero 
because the overseas 
public pension amount is 
greater than the rate of 
NZS, the excess amount 
is then applied to directly 
reducing the other 
partner’s NZS.
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NZS entitlements or income.12 However, 
if either spouse is entitled to an overseas 
pension that is deemed to be subject to 
the DDP, NZS changes from an individual 
pension to one that is calculated for the 
couple. As the Retirement Commission’s 
2010 review stated:
If one partner’s NZS is fully reduced 
to zero because the overseas public 
pension amount is greater than the 
rate of NZS, the excess amount is then 
applied to directly reducing the other 
partner’s NZS. In some cases it can 
mean that a New Zealand citizen who 
has lived and worked all their lives in 
this country receives no NZS because 
their partner receives a public pension 
from overseas. This is an inconsistent 
piece of policy that goes against the 
principle of universal individual 
entitlement and needs to be changed. 
(Retirement Commission, 2010, p.79)
The official support for section 70 
is sometimes stated as a concern that 
if there is a concession for the current 
position with regard to those who are 
entitled to NZS, other ‘beneficiaries’ may 
also claim similar treatment in respect 
of other (non-age pension) benefits. 
This concern seems unjustified because 
NZS for those aged over 65, although it 
is described as a benefit in section 3 of 
the Social Security Act, is not a welfare 
benefit (Ministry of Social Development, 
2011); it is a universal pension, granted as 
an individual entitlement under separate 
legislation and without regard to the 
pensioner’s own ‘other income’ or the 
spouse’s income. There is no logic in 
denying NZS to someone who happens 
to marry the ‘wrong’ person when, if 
they were not married, or were married 
to someone else, they would receive the 
full amount. Yet, ‘[i]n some situations a 
person can lose complete entitlement to 
NZS in their own right as a result of their 
partner’s personal overseas state pension 
offsetting the entitlement of both of them’ 
(Retirement Commission, 2010, p.130).
This practice would appear to meet 
the stringent tests applied to establish 
discrimination under the Human Rights 
Act,13 and is therefore an indefensible 
inequity. Fixing this inequity would 
require an amendment to section 70 of 
the Social Security Act, and there would 
be some cost involved; however, MSD’s 
2009 data showed only 124 pensioners 
affected, and retrospective payments 
need not be incurred. While the numbers 
are likely to rise, the annual cost of fixing 
this anomaly may be of the order of $2-3 
million a year,14 a small price to pay for 
fairness, given that the total budgeted 
cost of NZS in 2011/12 is $9.6 billion 
(Treasury, 2011). 
Improved information
Personal stories related by superannuitants 
about the treatment of their overseas 
pensions suggest that the ministry applies 
the current rules inconsistently. Also, 
unfortunately, it seems the local MSD 
offices provide inconsistent and misleading 
advice on entitlements. The inconsistency 
is explained in part by the complexity 
of pensions and social security policy 
and legislation. However, the emotional 
and financial cost for all parties of many 
unsatisfactory reviews and appeals could 
have been avoided, and the interests of 
equity, transparency and consistency 
could be served, if the rules and review 
decisions were published in an accessible 
format and by country of pension origin. 
Also, the reasons behind the classification 
decisions for each case could be published, 
and be subject to review and appeal by 
interested individuals, not necessarily just 
affected pensioners, as is presently the 
case. At the end of that process, the review 
and appeal decision should apply to all 
affected individuals, even-handedly and 
openly.
It would also be helpful if individuals 
could apply for a decision, with the 
appropriate review/appeal processes, 
before reaching the entitlement age for 
NZS. This would allow them to make 
appropriate financial planning decisions 
for retirement.15
The detailed application of the DDP 
to pensions from countries covered by 
a social security agreement needs to be 
easily accessible. Once the features of 
what constitutes a pension analogous to 
NZS have been identified, such pensions 
where the DDP would apply, and their 
country of origin, could be published by 
the MSD in all relevant brochures and 
websites. Until very recently, inaccurate or 
misleading written material was available 
to immigrants. For example, the ministry’s 
Departures and Arrivals brochures 
suggested that an immigrant ‘may be 
entitled to two pensions’. The erroneous 
impression was that the overseas pension 
did not affect the immigrant’s future 
NZS entitlements. Legally there may be 
two pensions, but, as the MSD’s website 
explains, ‘Generally, you will get paid the 
same amount as those who have lived all 
their lives in New Zealand. This amount 
may be made up of a combination of 
your New Zealand and overseas benefit 
or pension payments.’16
The MSD is in the process of updating 
the brochure for each country, and as far 
as possible is attempting to specifically 
address each pension to which an 
immigrant might be entitled, and how 
that pension might affect the calculation 
of NZS under the DDP, with illustrative 
examples. These improved brochures are 
now available, before immigrants select 
New Zealand as their destination. 
The main countries currently affected 
by New Zealand’s overseas pensions 
policy (shown in Table 1) are the UK, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, the 
United States and China. The ministry 
could proceed with the suggested 
reforms on a country-by-country basis, 
prioritised by the numbers of affected 
people. As the OECD (2009) notes, 
descriptions and comparisons within and 
between pensions systems are not easy, 
Australians who emigrate 
to New Zealand at 
or approaching the 
state pension age 
are potentially more 
favourably treated than 
New Zealanders who 
emigrate to Australia in 
similar circumstances.
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and are regularly subject to major and 
minor change. Regular updating of such 
information is necessary. 
The issues noted above were also raised 
in the Review of Retirement Income Policy 
(Retirement Commission, 2010). These 
issues affect pensions from all countries, 
not just from those nine countries with 
which New Zealand has social security 
agreements. Unambiguous information 
needs to be available in all countries from 
which New Zealand expects to attract 
migrants.
The special case of Australia
The relationship with Australia requires 
special attention for both the short and 
the long term. For example, Australians 
who emigrate to New Zealand at or 
approaching the state pension age are 
potentially more favourably treated than 
New Zealanders who emigrate to Australia 
in similar circumstances.17 As Table 1 
shows, the numbers of beneficiaries from 
Australia affected by section 70 have grown 
faster than any other group.18 Australian 
retirees in New Zealand may enjoy a clear 
advantage, given that, unlike the universal 
NZS, the Australian age pension is means-
tested, and the Australian employment-
based pension can be cashed up and 
brought to New Zealand without being 
affected by the DDP. The richest Australian 
may immigrate to New Zealand, bringing 
their employment-based savings, and get 
the full NZS. 
Currently there are 17,895 people 
entitled to an NZS payment in Australia, 
including 550 clients who get a nil NZS 
payment because the agreement requires 
that they are paid the lesser of their 
entitlement to NZS or their entitlement to 
the Australian means-tested age pension 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2011, 
p.315). While there are presently only 
7,240 New Zealand superannuitants with 
an Australian pension in New Zealand, 
there are more than 500,000 former New 
Zealand residents under retirement age 
now living in Australia (ibid., p.309). 
In the future, with an increasing state 
pension age in Australia (rising from 65 
to 67 between 2017 and 2023),19 a harsher 
income test, and because ‘totalisation’ 
can be applied under the social security 
agreement, New Zealand may become a 
relatively attractive place for Australians 
to retire to. The wealthier they are, the 
less the Australian government pays 
to offset NZS. This may prove costly 
and inequitable for the working-age 
population of New Zealand.20 
Other costly unanticipated consequences  
of current policy
An emotional cost, rather than a monetary 
cost, is implicit in the review and appeal 
rights expressed in sections 10 and 12 of the 
Social Security Act. Tracing the relevant 
case law, and reading the records provided 
by appellants, shows that reviews and 
appeals have seldom if ever resulted in the 
chief executive’s decision being overturned 
to the benefit of the pensioner. 
While the modest qualification 
requirements make NZS an easy pension 
to understand and administer, there 
are significant difficulties when co-
ordinating it with entitlements arising 
from overseas pension arrangements. 
Issues already noted are: determining 
which overseas pensions are ‘analogous’ 
and should therefore be offset under 
the DDP; requested changes create the 
potential problem of a fiscal ‘black hole’ 
as a consequence of adverse selection; 
the absence of any requirement for 
contribution to the tax base; and the 
modest residency-based qualification 
requirements for a basic universal NZS, 
may attract retirees from countries 
overseas where there is not such an 
accessible and generous recognition of 
the non-financial contributions and 
future needs of the aged. 
The potentially large fiscal cost in 
pensions and health care created by 
this attractive and accessible option for 
immigrants is exacerbated by the 2010 
NZSRI Act amendments, increasing the 
ease with which emigrants can leave, 
taking NZS, on a pro rata basis, with them 
to their overseas retirement destination. 
Possible solutions 
New Zealand’s current policy settings 
and the absence of clear principles have 
resulted in insufficient weight being 
given to the right to achieve a degree of 
income replacement through voluntary 
supplementation via state-administered 
(or mandated) arrangements in other 
countries (Smith, 2009). As already noted, 
many of the inequities in the treatment 
of overseas pensions can be resolved by 
administrative changes. 
Section 70 applies to all benefits 
administered by the MSD, including NZS. 
Having a single legislative provision that 
covers all benefits provided by the MSD, 
and co-ordinating retirement income 
arrangements of two or more countries, 
multiplies that complexity. It requires 
that the MSD has a wide discretion. 
The 2001 NZSRI Act could be amended 
to include an equivalent to section 70 
designed specifically for NZS.21 With a 
separate decision-making power with 
respect to NZS, the MSD could make 
decisions on retirement income benefits 
without needing to be concerned with 
potential precedents that might affect 
other welfare benefits. With that separate 
power, the human rights issues regarding 
spousal pensions could be resolved.
In contrast to New Zealand’s ‘all-or-
nothing’ test, nearly all other countries 
calculate pensions based on periods of 
residence and/or periods of employment 
and/or contributions (or those of a spouse) 
in that country.22 Shorter residence or 
contribution periods mean a smaller state 
pension. This system obviates the need for 
a DDP or an equivalent ‘harmonisation’ 
provision. To the extent that overseas 
pensions are portable, each country bears 
In contrast to New 
Zealand’s ‘all-or-nothing’ 
test, nearly all other 
countries calculate 
pensions based on 
periods of residence and/
or periods of employment 
and/or contributions (or 
those of a spouse) in that 
country. 
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the pension costs for periods of residence/
employment in that country. 
For those who emigrate from New 
Zealand to a non-social security agreement 
country, the 2010 amendment apportions 
gross NZS based on the 1/540 rule.23 The 
RPRC considered such a reform principle 
for those who immigrate to New Zealand 
(Littlewood and Dale, 2010). Under this 
reform, if the applicant for NZS has a 
pension from overseas that is analogous to 
NZS, their entitlement would be 1/540th 
of NZS for each month of residence in 
New Zealand between the ages of 20 and 
65. Any entitlement to an overseas pension 
would not be affected; the MSD would 
not need to know the amount or other 
terms of the overseas pension, but usual 
income tax rules would apply to the total 
income received. For immigrants, this 
formula would replace the current ten-
year residency requirement, and would 
apportion entitlement to NZS based on 
the 540-month system that now applies 
to emigrants from New Zealand after age 
65 under the 2010 amendment.
Each country would pay the age 
pension accrued during the period the 
person lived/worked in that country. 
Combining those entitlements would 
give a full, ‘blended’ pension without 
any country subsidising another. Such 
blending would require changes to current 
policy and legislation applying to NZS. 
It also requires every country’s pension 
scheme to be understood and assessed 
by MSD, with transparent decisions as 
to what basic pensions would trigger this 
assessment. 
Such changes to NZS would, however, 
remove the simple, clear, universal basis 
of NZS and add to the complexity and 
uncertainty of entitlements, and ensure 
that at least some immigrants would 
have insufficient to live on without other 
welfare assistance. Women are potentially 
adversely affected if they have only a 
small or no overseas pension, reflecting 
limited work experience.
A possible way forward
Rather than tinker with administrative rules 
in a complex reform to apportion NZS as 
outlined above, a possible solution may lie 
in reform of the residency requirement for 
NZS, and abandoning of the DDP.
The residency requirement for 
eligibility for NZS, for example, could be 
increased from the current 10(5) rule24 
to a single test of, say, 25 years’ residence 
between ages 20 and 65. Unlike the 
current arrangement, there would be no 
possibility of meeting the requirement 
using residency after age 65. Where there 
is a social security agreement, totalisation 
of years of residence would be possible, 
but only one pension would then be 
payable. For example, any entitlement 
to the United Kingdom’s basic state 
pension may be forgone if those years of 
residence in the UK were used to qualify 
for NZS. Where there is no social security 
agreement, or the 25 years of residence 
is satisfied without totalisation, any 
overseas pension would not be taken into 
account in the calculation of NZS (except 
as taxable income). 
If NZS required at least 25 years’ 
residence between the ages of 20 and 
65,25 it may then be far less important to 
identify the kinds of overseas pensions 
that are brought into New Zealand. Since 
85% of the 51,618 NZS recipients caught 
by the DDP have lived in New Zealand 
for more than 30 years (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2005), a 25-year residency 
record could largely eliminate the perceived 
inequities related to the DDP. This policy 
change would help these retirees, the bulk 
of whom have modest resources only.  
To prevent hardship, and retain the 
human rights standards for people who 
do not meet residency of 25 years for 
NZS, an emergency or other welfare 
benefit would continue to be available,26 
and any overseas pension would be taken 
into account in the household income 
test. That would reduce the income-tested 
benefit, but not by as much as the existing 
dollar-for-dollar DDP arrangement. The 
existing married rate and single rate 
for NZS would be retained, but every 
person’s entitlement would be individual. 
This would prevent the current situation 
where a spouse has their pension reduced 
when their partner’s overseas pension 
exceeds the NZS married-person rate. 
With regard to the trans-Tasman 
issues, the existing social security 
agreement with Australia would need 
to be renegotiated. For example, if a 
New Zealander retiring to Australia had 
fulfilled the 25 years in New Zealand, 
they might get the full pro rata NZS with 
a top-up Australian age pension if they 
qualify. An Australian retiring to New 
Zealand would also need to meet the 25-
year requirement to receive the full NZS 
(without totalisation). If totalisation is 
used to meet the 25 years they should not 
receive NZS at a greater rate than their 
entitlement to the Australian means-
tested age pension. Under the stricter 
residency requirement, those qualifying 
would be able to supplement their NZS 
with additional retirement income derived 
domestically, like KiwiSaver, or from state 
and private sources from overseas. 
There are some issues that would 
need to be resolved that are not addressed 
in this article, and in any new policy 
or policy change there are issues at the 
margin that need to be addressed to 
ensure new inequities are not created. 
Some principles would need to be clearly 
stated to determine what would happen: 
for example, if someone had resided 
in New Zealand for 24 years and three 
months prior to reaching age 65. 
The transition from the pension 
policies that prevail now to the 
proposed system would require careful 
consideration. Backdating would not be 
possible: the new system would need to 
begin with a ‘clean slate’. 
In general, this option for reform 
improves equity and transparency 
and acknowledges the complexity 
If NZS required at least 
25 years’ residence 
between the ages of 20 
and 65, it may then be far 
less important to identify 
the kinds of overseas 
pensions that are brought 
into New Zealand.
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of state involvement. Vertical equity 
considerations may require reform of 
the taxation of other income and NZS, 
so that local and overseas retirees with 
higher incomes, including incomes from 
lump sum superannuation benefits, pay 
appropriate taxation. There would be 
issues, too, around whether the NZS for 
emigrants would be gross or net in non-
agreement countries. 
Conclusion
In 2012 section 70 remains in place and 
intact. Despite the possible human rights 
implications, the reforms proposed 
by MSD itself, the Human Rights 
Commission, the Retirement Commission 
and the RPRC have not been adopted. Yet 
few of the immediate recommendations 
require legislative amendments, or entail 
significant costs. 
This article proposes a particular 
approach to perceived problems with 
direct deduction and residency policies. 
More development of the proposed 
policy changes would reveal the impact 
these changes would have on migration, 
poverty rates, who would gain and who 
would lose, and how much the new 
policies would cost. 
The recommended administrative 
changes could be implemented 
promptly, as they involve modest cost 
while providing great improvements in 
human rights and in the equity of New 
Zealand’s overseas pensions policy. This 
includes, as a priority, removing the 
marital discrimination. The proposals 
for changes to the arrangements with 
Australia and the longer-view options 
require a research-informed and open 
discussion with all affected parties, 
including potentially affected pensioners. 
Once decisions have been made on the 
short-term changes and the longer-term 
reforms contemplated, social security 
agreements would need to be reviewed, 
and perhaps renegotiated. 
The starting point for the necessary 
debate is a discussion about the residency 
requirement. Raising this to a meaningful 
level, from 10 years currently to 25 years, 
will help address the fiscal risk posed and 
the intergenerational burden imposed 
by an age pension that, in international 
comparisons, is both generous and 
accessible.  
1  The DDP was originally established by the 1938 Social 
Security Act.
2  See the appendix for a list of RPRC publications and forums.
3  ‘We might also ask whether the projected numbers of those 
aged	65+	years	is	likely	to	be	accurate.	The	data	…	are	
based on the medium case projections, which assume an 
increase in life expectancy at birth by 2061 of 7.6 years 
for males and 6.5 years for females. Several sets of 10 
projections in fact exist, three based on higher life expectancy 
assumptions (Series 7, 8, and 9). However it would appear 
that all might be a little conservative’ (Jackson, 2011, pp.9-
10).
4	 	The	labour	force	participation	rate	for	those	aged	65+	rose	
to 19.5% between December 2010 and December 2011 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2012, p.6), although it is likely that 
at least some of that significant increase was a response to 
the global financial crisis, and the diminishing of their assets.
5  See http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/. 
6  Some American states, and some countries, including Chile, 
do not impose income tax on foreign pensions  (http://www.
spencerglobal.com/chile-tax-law/35-chile-taxes/115-income-
tax-in-chile.html). 
7  It is also noted that social security agreements that enable 
immigrants without sufficient residence for NZS to use 
residence in the country from which they have emigrated to 
qualify (‘totalisation’) may entail other anomalies.
8  KiwiSaver, launched in 2007, is a privately-provided, 
auto-enrolment, opt-out retirement saving scheme, with 
modest minimum employer and employee contributions. If an 
employee becomes a member, the employer’s contribution up 
to 2% (3% from 1 April 2013) is compulsory.
9  Since 2002 the government can also be challenged under 
part 1a of the Human Rights Act when people feel they have 
been discriminated against in public policy.
10  Previously called the ‘state earnings related pension scheme’ 
or SERPS.
11  It is noted that in January 2012 the Ministry of 
Social Development deferred the deduction of pension 
amounts derived from voluntary contributions (personal 
communication from older people’s and international policy 
unit, MSD).
12  The exception is where a ‘young’ spouse of a superannuitant 
applies for NZS before reaching age 65.
13  See http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/resources/resources.
php#case for Human Rights Commission complaints 
information, and fact sheets covering discriminatory laws: 
discrimination by the public sector and the private sector.
14  This probable overestimate, based on 2009 data, assumes 
that full entitlement to NZS for the non-pension spouse is to 
be restored (http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2010/ise/
v10/105.htm).
15  Access to detailed information on overseas pensions is now 
available in the OECD’s Pensions at a Glance series.
16  See http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/
travelling-or-migrating/getting-an-overseas-benefit-or-pension-
in-nz.html#Howmuchcanyouget2.
17  See http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/international/ssa/
currentagreements/Pages/nz-nz.aspx.
18   In part this fast growth reflects changes made in 2002 
to the way the governments of the two countries share the 
pension costs.
19  The state pension age for the majority of OECD member 
countries is 65 years, with the exception of France and 
Turkey with a pension age of 60. Iceland, Norway and the 
US are phasing in an age of 67, and in 2009 the UK and 
Australia announced their intention to increase the age of 
state pension entitlement to 67. See http://www.centrelink.
gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/individuals/ssp_age_pension.htm.
20  These issues are outlined in Smith (2011), St John and Dale 
(2010) and Littlewood and Dale (2010).
21  In some of the benefit ‘machinery’ provisions, the NZSRI Act 
is already cross-referenced (e.g. section 71); in other cases 
where NZS itself may be at issue (e.g. section 71A, section 
76), the reference is to the NZS benefit; finally, in other cases 
there is no specific reference to NZS at all (e.g. section 70A 
and 72), suggesting that there are no insurmountable barriers 
to drafting a modernised replacement in the NZSRI Act.
22  Note that Australia, Mauritius, Samoa, Nepal, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Botswana, Bolivia, Brunei, Kosovo and Mexico 
City all provide equivalents to NZS, and similar entitlement 
provisions.
23  Payment will be based on the number of months of 
residence in New Zealand between the ages of 20 and 
65. See: http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/
travelling-or-migrating/pension-going-overseas/residing-in-
any-other-country.html#Howmuchcanyouget2. 
24  Under the Old Age Pensions Act 1898 the residency 
requirement was 25 years. By 1937 this had been reduced 
to 10 years, probably to encourage immigration (Ashton and 
St John, 1988). Under the 1938 Social Security Act the 
residency requirement was increased to 20 years, until in 
1977, with the introduction of National Superannuation, it 
was reduced again 10 years (Dale, St John and Littlewood, 
2009, p. 11) .
25  Perhaps the requirement would include 10 years from the 
age of 50 years, meaning New Zealand would be likely to 
benefit from some mature and skilled contribution from 
immigrants.
26	 	In	2010,	for	example,	4,832	people	aged	65+	were	
receiving an emergency benefit. When they have resided 
in New Zealand for the required ten years, the majority 
of these people would transfer to NZS (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2011, p.117). 
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